We show that for a specific class of random matching Edgeworthian economies, the expectation of the limiting equilibrium price coincides with the equilibrium price of the related Walrasian economies. This result extends to the study of economies in the presence of uncertainty within the multi-period Arrow-Debreu model, allowing to understand the dynamics of how beliefs survive and propagate through the market.
Introduction
The problem of providing strategic foundations of general equilibrium theory, has been a long standing problem of crucial importance in economic theory. The main objective of this strand of thought is to provide a market game, which is realistic enough to describe the behaviour of agents in real market situations, such that the equilibrium of this game approaches under certain conditions the competitive equilibrium for the same market. A particularly fruitful way of pursuing this line of research is through the use of dynamic matching games, in which agents meet randomly, and exchange rationally, according to local rules. Such attempts started with the seminal work Mathematical Pshycics of Francis Ysidro Edgeworth in 1881 (see Edgeworth (1881) ) and were further advanced by a number of researchers, including Aliprantis et al. (1987) , Aumann (1987) ; Aumann and Shapley (1974) , Binmore and Herrero (1988) , Gale (2000) , McLennan and Schonnenschein (1991) , MasColell (1989) , Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) and Shubik (1959) .
This work wishes to contribute to this literature, by studying conditions under which the equilibrium of a market game, defined by a random matching game (see Binmore and Herrero (1988) ), approaches the equilibrium of a fully competitive Walrasian model. The random matching game, consists of agents, paired at random, who exchange goods at the bilateral Walras equilibrium price. The aim of the present work is to provide some results on the expectation of this random variable p ∞ , and how this compares to the Walrasian price. In particular, under some rather general symmetry conditions on the initial endowments of the agents and distribution of initial preferences, we show that the expectation of the logarithm of p ∞ equals the logarithm of the Walrasian price for the same initial endowments of the agents. Hence, even though the agents meet and trade myopically in random pairs, they somehow "self-organize" and the expected limiting price equals that of a market where a central planner announces prices and all the agents conform to them through utility maximization, as occurs in the Walrasian model. The main reason why organizing behaviour is observed is the symmetry in the endowments and preferences of the agents that, as will become clear from our analysis in the next section, poses global constraints in the market, in the sense that it enforces each agents to have a mirror, or a dual agent.
The results of the paper have an extension to the study of economies in the presence of uncertainty within the framework of the Arrow-Debreu model. The Arrow-Debreu model is the archetype of a complete financial market. The demand and supply of the Arrow Debreu securities, in a Walrasian manner, determines the equilibrium prices of the financial assets. Therefore, the Arrow-Debreu model is an extension of the Walras equilibrium model which allows the modeling of financial markets. Hence, the Arrow-Debreu model is one of the key models used in describing the dynamics of formation of prices in financial markets which retain the feature of completeness. Within the context of the present Arrow-Debreu type model, the preferences of the agents have to be interpreted as personalized views concerning the probability of occurrence of the different states of the world, whereas the two goods have to be interpreted as consumption levels of the same physical good, in different states of the world. As such this model provides a good framework for markets where there is not enough data on which a detailed study that will allow us to predict the probability of future states can be based. In the multi-period Arrow-Debreu model that we study, the effect of the symmetry is to make the market converge to some Walrasian equilibrium, out of which an "average" Arrow-Debreu measure may be extracted, which depends on the statistics of the views of each agent, concerning the states of the world, as well as on the initial endowments. Therefore, the model allows some understanding of the dynamics, of how beliefs survive and propagate through the market, and may serve as a paradigm for evolutionary finance.
The Walrasian model
We look at a pure exchange economy ( , X i , i , w i ) where is the population of agents, each of them characterized by a consumption set X i ∈ R 2 + and the agents preferences i . So, an exchange economy in which some given amounts of goods X and Y are distributed among N agents (agent i owns an initial endowment x i , y i of good X and Y respectively) is considered. Note that the initial endowments (x i , y i ) ∈ int (X i ). We consider agents A i with preferences that can be described by Cobb-Douglas type utility functions
where the utility function is determined by the preference α i of the agent A i . The Cobb-Douglas utility function is a model which is so well rooted in economic theory that its use hardly needs to be justified. As stated in the excellent review paper of Lloyd (2001) the Cobb-Douglas function has been around for ages, even well before its formal statement by Cobb and Douglas, and its roots are inherent in the works of Mill, Pareto, Wicksell, Von Thünen, and for various reasons serves as the standard test bed for a great number of studies in mathematical economics. One of these reasons is its mathematical simplicity, which however, captures important theoretical issues such as constant marginal rate of substitution. However, this is not the sole reason for its generalized use. Recent results of Voorneveld (2008) show that the utility function being of the Cobb-Douglas form is equivalent to the preferences of the agents having the property of strict monotonicity, homotheticity in each coordinate and upper semicontinuity. These properties are rather generic properties for the preferences, which can be seen as very reasonable modelling assumptions. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence, according to which with very large and increasing per capita income the utility function becomes asymptotically indistinguishable from Cobb-Douglas. These very interesting results shed new light on the Cobb-Douglas utility function and provides further justification for its use as a standard model, apart from its apparent analytical simplicity.
The Walrasian general equilibrium model assumes that consumers are passive price takers. They regard a given set of prices as parameters in determining their optimal net demands and supplies. The equilibrium price is such that the market clears. Then the consumers change their endowments by the allocations determined by the equilibrium price. A mechanism that leads to the equilibrium price can be achieved, for instance, through an auctioneer who collects all the offers and demands for each good and adjusts the price vector to clear the market. Let A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A N } be a collection of N agents. The agent A i starts with a preference α i and an initial endowment (x i , y i ). The Walrasian equilibrium price p(ω A ) is given by 
The bilateral trade occurs when N = 2, and the Walrasian equilibrium price is called the bilateral equilibrium price. The bilateral trade is the well known scenario analyzed in the Edgeworth box diagram (see Fig. 1 ). The horizontal axis represents the amount of good X and the vertical represents the amount of good Y of participant i. The point (x i + x j , y i + y j ) is the vertex opposite to the origin. The horizontal and vertical lines starting at the opposite vertex are the axes representing the amounts of good X and Y , respectively, of participant j. We represent in the Edgeworth box the indifference curves for both participants passing through the point corresponding to the initial endowments of both participants. The core is the curve where the indifference curves of both participants are tangent and such that the utilities of both participants are greater or equal to the initial ones. The bilateral price determines a segment of allocations that pass through the point corresponding to the initial endowments. The interception of this segment with the core determines the new allocations
The p-statistical duality
We introduce the concept of duality in the market for the agents. Statistical duality for the agents guarantees that the prices observed in the random matching Edgeworthian economy coincide in expectation with those of the Walrasian economy. We assume that a collection of agents is completely characterized by their preferences α, and their endowments (x, y) in the 2 goods. We define a probability distribution function f (α, x, y), on (α, x, y) space which provides the probability that an agent has preferences in (α, α + dα) × (x, x + dx) × (y, y + dy). We assume that the probability distribution has compact support, and the support in (x, y) is bounded away from zero.
Definition 1
We say that a market satisfies the p-statistical duality condition if the probability function has the symmetry property
The p-statistical duality property means that each agent with characteristics (α, x, y) has a mirror agent with characteristics (1 − α, y/ p, p x) with the same probability under f . The class of probability functions f (α, x, y) of the form f 1 (α) f 2 (x, y) with the property that f 1 (α) = f 1 (1−α) and f 2 (x, y) = f 2 (y/ p, p x) satisfies the p-statistical duality. A common probability function f 2 , satisfying the above condition, is the uniform distribution. Another common example of a probability function satisfying the p-statistical duality is used in Corollary 1, below, and determines the most well known matching technology used in random matching games with N agents.
Random matching Edgworthian economies
Each agent A i starts with a preference α i and a set of initial endowments (x i (0), y i (0)). N agents are picked up randomly with or without replacement according to a given probability distribution f satisfying the p-statistical duality. Hence, the initial choice of agents is a random event which will be denoted by ω A . We can define the random variable A(ω A ) = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A N } which is the initial choice of agents that will participate in the market. Let p(ω A ) be the Walrasian equilibrium price of the market for this collection of agents A(ω A ) of N agents. Let E[ln( p(ω A ))] be the expectation of the logarithm of the Walrasian equilibrium price p(ω A ) computed with respect to the initial consumption bundles of the agents over all the initial collections A(ω A ) of N agents. Now, let us consider that the collection A(ω A ) of agents trade in random pairs chosen with the same probability, and after the t trade they end up with a consumption bundle (x i (t), y i (t)) which are traded in the bilateral equilibrium price p(t), given by the formula (1) with N = 2 and with x i , x j , y i , y j substituted by x i (t − 1), x j (t − 1), y i (t − 1), y j (t − 1). On each trade only two randomly chosen agents i, j exchange goods, and the consumption bundles of all the other agents
Having initially chosen the group of agents A = {A 1 , . . . , A N }, denote by ω r the infinite sequence of pairs ω r = (ω r (1), ω r (2), . . .) where ω r (t) is the pair (i(t), j (t)), i(t) = j (t), corresponding to the pair of agents (A i(t) , A j (t) ) that have been randomly chosen to trade at time t. A full run of the game is the sequence ω A ω r that is an initial choice of agents and an infinite sequence of random matchings. A finite time run of the game is the sequence ω A ω r |t where ω r |t is the restriction of ω r for the first t random matchings.
Let p(t, ω A ω v ) be the bilateral price of the trade at time t determined by the finite run ω A ω v . The bilateral equilibrium price, determines the unique point in the core such that the market "locally" clears. In some sense, the agents behave in a myopic way, interacting only in pairs, and not forseeing the future interactions or keeping memory of their past encounters. Let E[ln( p(t, ω A ω v A ω r ) )] be the expected value of the logarithm of the limiting price p(ω A ω r ) over all the possible distributions of the agents A(ω A ) and over all random matchings ω r depending on the actual game of the play, that is the exact order of the random pairing of the agents.
Theorem 1 (p-statistical duality fixed point) Assume a market consisting of a finite number of agents, such that p-statistical duality holds for the initial endowments, then
Furthermore,
In Theorem 1, the advantage of using the logarithm of the price is that if we consider the other good to be the enumeraire, the absolute value of the logarithm of the price keeps the same and just the sign of the value of the logarithm of the price changes. In particular, Theorem 1 is a fixed point theorem for the expected value E[ln( p(t, ω A ω v )] that is proven to be a fixed point along time t. The theorem can also be shown to hold for a generalized random matching economy in which agents do not only meet in pairs. In this game, we initially pick N agents and then for each trading date we pick randomly M ≤ N agents, that decide to trade on the competitive price for the local market consisting only of these M agents. The number M, may change with t. Then, under our statistical duality condition, it may be shown that the stated result holds (see Pinto and Yannacopoulos (2011) ).
Matching games with dual agents
A relevant and well known example of an economy with the p-statistical duality property is an economy where with probability 1 we start with a sample of N = 2 M agents where M agents have characteristics (a i , x i , y i ), i = 1, . . . , M, and the remaining M agents have characteristics
In other words, in this economy, each agent has a dual agent, i.e. agent i is dual to agent i + M where i = 1, . . . , M.
Corollary 1 Assume a market consisting of a finite number N = 2M of agents, such that M agents have characteristics (a
i , x i , y i ), i = 1, .
. . , M, and the remaining M agents have characteristics
, for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , +∞}. Fig. 2 The horizontal line corresponds to d = 0. a The error bar is, as usual, centered in the mean and the upper (resp. lower) limit is the mean plus (resp. minus) the standard deviation. b The error bar is centered in the mean and the upper (resp. lower) limit is the mean plus (resp. minus) the standard deviation over the square root of the number of runs (100) Furthermore,
where E is the expectation over all possible runs of the game.
Beyond the p-statistical duality
We consider an example of an economy where with probability 1 we start with a sample of N = 2 M agents where M agents are of type A with characteristics (α A , x A , y A ), and the remaining M agents are of type B and have characteristics (α B , x B , y B ) . We consider that the initial endowments of the two goods are x i = y i = 1/N for all agents and that α A = α − 0.25 and α B = α + 0.25 with α ∈]0, 1[. Let p α (ω A ω r ) = lim t→∞ p α (t, ω A ω r ) be the limiting price, for a given run of the game, where p α (t, ω A ω r ) is the bilateral equilibrium price at trade t. Our object of study is the value
is the expectation over all runs of the game. The p-statistical duality holds for α = 0.5 giving d 0.5 = 0. We observe, in Fig. 2 , that when we deviate α from 0.5, breaking the p-statistical duality, the value of d α varies continuously with α. Furthermore, for values of α close to 0.5, d α looks as a contact with order greater than one to the horizontal line at 0. Hence, these numerical results give evidence that Theorem 1 is robust in the sense that d α is small for small deviations from the p-statistical duality.
Lemma 1 There exists a random variable p(ω) such that
where by ω = ω A ω v we denote a particular realization of the game, that is an initial choice of N agents A(ω A ) and the subsequent random pair matchings.
To facilitate the presentation of the proof of Theorem 1, we need the following notation.
We will identify an agent A i at time t, hereafter denoted by A i (t), with the triple (α i , x i (t), y i (t)) consisting of her preference and her consumption bundle at time t. We say that agent A i at time t, which we will hereafter denote by
Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose that we have two initial sets of agents A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A N } and B = {B 1 , . . . , B N }, such that every agent B i =Ā i is the dual agent of A i . Choose a run of the play ω r . After each trade t + 1, the consumption bundles of the agents (i, j) that have exchanged will be given by the following formulae
and similarly for j where the bilateral equilibrium price
.
We observe from (3) that, if ω(t) = (i(t), j (t)) and (A
That means that the random dynamical system defined by equations (3) is equivariant under the duality transformation. By statistical duality, for each run of the economy ω := ω A ω r we have a dual run ω := ωĀω r with the same probability P(ω A ω r |t) = P(ω B ω r |t). Therefore, by (4), the statistical duality is invariant over time. Again, by (4), we obtain that
which implies, by statistical duality, that
Observe that equation (5) reflects the invariance of the marginal rate of substitution for dual pairings.
Consider now the Walrasian price p ω for the initial choice of agents A. In this case, we assume that all agents trade simultaneously in one time step. The Walrasian price is given by the formula
Taking logarithms in this formula and averaging over all possible choices of the initial agents, we obtain that statistical duality implies that E[ln(
Let us now consider the case where t = ∞. There exists a constant K ≥ 0 such that for all t, we have that | ln( p(t, ω A ω v ) ) |≤ K almost surely. The boundendess of the price follows from the assumption that all the distribution of endowments for the agents has compact support which is bounded away from 0 for all t. Then by a direct application of Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem we have that
from which follows that
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
An extension to Arrow-Debreu economies
The results of the paper have an extension to the study of economies in the presence of uncertainty within the framework of the Arrow-Debreu model. We first recall some basic concepts regarding the Arrow-Debreu model. The Arrow-Debreu model is a fundamental mathematical model proposed by Keneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu in order to describe the effects of uncertainty on the prices of financial assets. The original Arrow-Debreu model considers 2 possible dates where the market operates. According to the model, there are S possible future states of nature and only one will materialize at time t = 1. However, at time t = 0, the agents must make their decisions concerning consumption, only knowing the probabilities { p s } of the various states of the world. Furthermore, there are only S financial assets available, the so called Arrow-Debreu securities. Each asset provides 1 unit of consumption if at t = 1 the relevant state of the world materializes and 0 otherwise. The agents, therefore, have to decide at t = 0 on a portfolio on these assets which will be used at time t = 1 so as to maximize the utility of their consumption at this time. The demand and supply of the Arrow-Debreu securities, in a Walrasian manner, determines the equilibrium prices of the financial assets.
The Arrow-Debreu model has extensions to multiperiod, i.e. to markets assumed to operate for more than one time instant. In this case, we assume that the above scenario repeats between the time instants t and t + 1, and when working between t + 1 and t + 2, the initial endowment at t + 1 is just the outcome of the trade that took place between t and t + 1. It is within this entension that we wish to operate, and apply our results on the connection between Walrasian and Edgeworth equilibria. To this end, we consider a economy with uncertainty, in which two states of the world are possible. Furthermore, only one of these states may occur in each time instance, with probability (α, 1 − α), respectively. We also consider good 1 and good 2 as consumption levels of a single consumption good at each state of the world. We allow each agent to have her own personalized view concerning the probability of the occurence of future states of the world. Consider that agents, make their decisions according to an expected utility function of the logarithmic form
where C = (x, y) is now the random variable that describes consumption at different states of the world.
Notice, the formal similarity of the above model with that of the logarithm of the Cobb-Douglas function with two physical goods. The concept of statistical duality makes sense here, if interpreted as follows: For every agent having a certain idea about the probability of occurence of the future states of the world, there is a mirror agent, having the opposite ideas about them, as well as a "reflected" and properly dilated initial endowment, providing her the ability to consume in different states of the world. This spread in ideas about states of the world, reflects in some way the absence of information in the economy. Therefore, this model may be a good model for markets in which there is no clear idea concerning the future states of the world that are about to emerge. Proof The problem of maximization of E[ln(C)] = α ln(x) + (1 − α) ln(y) is equivalent to the problem of maximization of exp(E[ln(C)]) = x α y 1−α which is of the same form as the Cobb-Douglas economy. Under the p-statistical duality assumption on the distribution of beliefs-consumption needs (α, x, y) for the group of agents we may apply Theorem 1 to this Cobb-Douglas economy and obtain the stated result.
Proposition 1 Assume that a finite group of agents in this Arrow
As mentioned above, the Walras equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a risk neutral probability measure concerning the future states of the world (Arrow-Debreu measure) which is the "beliefs" of the agents concerning these states so that no arbitrage opportunities can exist. The above proposition then has the following interesting interpretation. Out of a finite number of agents with heterogeneous beliefs, concerning the future states of the world, and the with heterogeneous needs concerning the future consumption, given that there is some sort of statistical symmetry in the market ( p-statistical duality) these randomly matching agents "self-organize" and in the long run their exchange leads to a convergence to the Walras equilibrium. Furthermore, recalling the Pareto optimality properties of the Walras equilibrium, we may conclude that this random matching economy may thus lead to optimal distribution of available assets for the distribution of risk and uncertainty among participating agents in this economy. This setting may be particularly well suited for the modelling of large financial markets.
Conclusions and directions for future work
In this work we have proved that under symmetry conditions prices in a random exchange economy with two goods, where the agents preferences are characterized by the Cobb-Douglas utility function, converge to the Walrasian price. We conjecture that this result holds for the case of n goods, of course under the proper symmetry conditions. It is interesting to see whether our results may be generalized to other utility functions, than the Cobb-Douglas with the proper generalization of the duality condition. Finally, it would be interesting to extend such results for the case of financial markets, especially in the case of incomplete markets (Pinto 2010) . Generalization to an infinite number of players is feasible following the ideas of Aumann and Shapley (1974) .
